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The introduction of the Companies Act 2006 brought significant changes as regards to the 
duties owed by directors to a company. It can be argued that the restrictions on company’s 
directors under s175 Companies Act 2006 are strict and inflexible. The result of the rule could 
possibly mean that a director can never make a profit from a transaction outside of their 
company without it amounting to a conflict of interest and therefore will be liable to account 
for any profit made. However, certain rules and case law surrounding directors’ duties may 
prove s175 Companies Act 2006 to not be as strict and inflexible as it seems at first glance. If 
a director was to follow a correct procedure, it is entirely possible they may make profit 
despite the issues surrounding conflicts of interests. This paper explores these possibilities.  
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Prior to the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), the majority of directors’ duties were founded on 
common law rules and equitable interests.1 This foundation still remains in place as explained 
by CA 2006 they ‘have effect in place of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed 
to a company by a director’.2 The duties of directors to their companies are set out between 
ss 170 - 177 of the Act. This is including a ‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’ which has been 
suggested to be strict and inflexible regarding a director being able to make a profitable 
transaction outside of their company.3 This is due to the transaction having a ‘direct or 
indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company’ 
which the Act states must be avoided.4  So, if a director wished to become a director of 
another company, or enter into an external contract for personal interest, it may prove to be 
a difficult task. Although on first appearance the Act may seem strict and inflexible, a closer 
inspection may prove otherwise. 
There are subtle but valuable statutory relaxations of the strict equitable requirement to 
obtain members' approval to authorise what would otherwise be breaches of fiduciary 
obligations.5 A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another 
in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence.6 Therefore, unless a private company invalidates it (or a public company permits 
it) section 175 expresses that through the authorisation of the other directors, a director can 
act upon what would otherwise be a conflict of interest.7 This is of course without the 
inclusion in any vote or quorum from the director it concerns or interests.8 This can however 
be stated differently in a company’s articles of association, which outline the rules and 
restrictions relating to the way a company operates and is governed, and therefore is 
subjective. The rule that the director in question is forbidden to vote may be foreseen as a 
‘strict’ one, but is arguably fair, as he would only vote in favour of himself. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that the process in which the conflict of interest is decided upon is objectively 
balanced fairly. This is because it is decided through ordinary resolution at a general meeting. 
 
1 J. Scott Slorach and Jason Ellis, Business Law (26th edn, OUP 2018) 72. 
2 Companies Act 2006 s 170(3). 
3 Ibid s 175. 
4 Ibid s 175(1). 
5 Stephen Acton, ‘A new direction?’ (2008) 158 NLJ 606. 
6 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
7 CA 2006 s 175(5) & 175(4)(b). 
8 CA 2006 s 175(6). 
An ordinary resolution is one which requires a simple majority of votes in favour if it is to be 
passed.9 ‘Simple majority’ means more votes in favour than against and an equality of votes 
is not sufficient.10 For example, 51% or above. Therefore, if there were four members 
(shareholders), presuming they all had equal shares in the company, three out of the four of 
them would be required to vote in favour of the potential conflict in order to allow it. 
Depending on the circumstances of the directors’ relationship with the other members, this 
may be a hard obstacle to overcome in the case of a conflict. Thus, illustrating a subjective 
process in the case of conflicts of interest. This ultimately conveys that if a director who is in 
the midst of a conflict of interest with the company, and manages to persuade his fellow 
directors’ and shareholder’s approval for that conflict to go ahead, the general duty of section 
175 is one of flexibility.11 It is true that if the majority of other members of that company fail 
to authorise the transaction, that ends the possibility for the director to enter into that 
transaction. Thus, signifying a strict, but flexible element to the restrictions of the director’s 
duties under the CA 2006. 
Strong evidence from past events illustrate duties from directors can be perceived as strict. A 
prime example being the case of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver.12 In this case, after the 
defendants sold their company (3 cinemas) they were found to have made a ‘secret profit’ 
from shares they sold from subscribing for as previous directors. The House of Lords decided 
that it was a secret profit since the opportunity to invest in the new company only came to 
the defendants because they were directors of Regal (Hastings).13 This rule is further 
supported by the CA 2006 as it states the Act ‘applies in particular to the exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity’.14 This demonstrates that any potential profit that is to 
be made from a conflicting transaction is at risk of being in breach of duties as a director. 
Therefore, supporting the claim that S.175 of the CA 2006 is strict and could perceive to be 
inflexible.  
It’s not section 175 alone that restricts a director from an external contract that may conflict 
with their companies’ interests. Section 177 of the CA 2006 explains the director’s ‘Duty to 
 
9 Slorach and Ellis (n 1) 139. 
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11 Ben Griffiths, ‘Dealing with directors' conflicts of interest under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 6 JIBFL 292. 
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declare interest in proposed transaction or arrangement’. The director must declare the 
nature and extent of that interest to the other directors.15 Cases such as ‘Cullen Investments 
Ltd and others v Brown and others’ convey the necessity of disclosing any personal 
investments made which may conflict with a director’s business.16 In this case, managing the 
conflict was impossible because it was concealed, so the company could not have consented 
to it.17 The defendant was found ‘in breach of his director's duties under s.175 of the 2006 
Act by reason of the conflict of interest, and was in breach of both s.172 and s.177 by reason 
of his failure to disclose the interest giving rise to that conflict.’18 This judgment presents itself 
with a strict avenue of necessary steps that must be taken in order to enter profitable 
transactions outside of a directors’ company. This includes S.172 CA 2006 which is the duty 
to promote the success of the company.19 This implies that when a director is making a 
transaction, they must always have in mind any consequences that may affect the company. 
This includes the interests of employees and any other consequences that may impact the 
company.20 This can evidently limit a director when entering into a transaction and must 
therefore always be aware of restrictions. Furthermore, if a director is dishonest and not 
disclosing profits, he will be found in breach of his directors’ duty and liable to account for 
any profits made.21 If on the other hand, there was full and frank disclosure to the members 
of the company and their approval had been obtained by ordinary resolution at a general 
meeting, an obligation to account for profits made would not arise.22 As long as the director 
in question declares their interests before the company enters into the transaction or 
arrangement and avoids dishonesty among other directors, personal and profitable interests 
outside their company is achievable.23 
Consequences due to breach of Section 177 CA 2006 have seen transactions reversed. In the 
case of Knightsbridge Property Development Corporation (UK) Ltd v South Chelsea Properties 
Ltd and Others a director of both companies had transferred land from one company to 
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another.24  The Defendant was acting in the interests of one company over the other and 
failed to consult any of the other directors before the transactions. This found the transaction 
of property to not be binding.25 The ruling here proves to be strict, but the Defendant had a 
flexible solution he did not pursue. If the director in this case had followed the rules set in 
S.175 and consulted the other directors of the company, the process of an ordinary resolution 
by means of a general meeting would have taken place.26 If then successful, the director in 
question would have completed his transaction as intended. As stated by Lord Goldsmith to 
the Lord Grand Committee ‘there is no prohibition of a conflict or potential conflict as long as 
it is has been authorised by the directors in accordance with the requirements set out in (the 
CA 2006).’27 This suggests that openness ought to feature when carrying out directorial 
functions and in particular, where a proposed transaction may cause a conflict of interest 
between the director and company.28 This would further comply with the rules set out in 
Section 175(4) CA 2006 and the ratification process set out in the Act.29 
More evidence of how a full disclosure can allow a director to make profitable interests can 
be seen in the case of Kleanthous v Paphitis and others.30 After the defendants failed to 
persuade other directors of their company to enter into a contract, they took it upon 
themselves to do so. They then created a new company to proceed with the purchase of the 
contract. The claimant’s brought the case against the defendants for breaching their duty not 
to accept benefits from third parties.31 It was decided there was no conflict of interest due to 
the full disclosure to the board, and was therefore processed correctly.32  This amplifies the 
rules laid out in the CA 2006. Through appropriately following the regulation of section 175(4), 
the director effectively entered into a contract outside of his company and was found not 
liable to account for any profit he has made. This successfully eliminates the stereotype 
directors’ duties being inflexible.  
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Although it may be true that S.175 CA provides a stricter approach towards directors being 
able to make profitable transactions outside their company, it is evidently flexible. There are 
numerous cases that imply there are strict restrictions on possibly conflicting transactions. 
However, we can see that if the correct procedure is complied with, in particular a director 
being open and honest about his possible proceedings, then the possibility of entering into 
conflicting transactions is achievable. Furthermore, liability to account for any profit made 
will only be pursued if found in breach of the Act. Section 175 CA 2006 can therefore be a 
strict rule but can be flexible depending on the circumstances. As long as a director follows 
the rules set out in the act from S.170 to S.177, namely S.175(4) in particular, then there is a 
significant opportunity to enter into a profitable transaction outside of their company. 
Therefore, to conclude, it is evident the statement that ‘the restrictions on company directors 
under S. 175 Companies Act 2006 are strict and inflexible’ can be seen as incorrect. For it is 
possible for a director to enter into a transaction outside of their company without it 
amounting to a conflict of interest. Therefore, the statement of flexibility is incorrect as it has 
proven through cases such as Kleanthous v Paphitis and others, and the statute itself to be 
flexible.33 On the other hand, there is little evidence that a director can in fact make a 
profitable transaction without being open and confront with his company’s board, as 
supported by cases such as Cullen Investments Ltd v Brown and Knightsbridge Property 
Development.34 This suggests a significant element of ‘strictness’ is present in the CA 2006 
with regards to directors’ duties. 
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